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Since there has been aviation there has been a turbulence problem. The
earliest aviators recognized several potentially turbulent situations such as
strong low-level winds across rough terrain, convective turbulence due to
solar heating and instability. They also had a great respect for the damaging
turbulence associated with thunderstorms. Much of this knowledge was based on
experience. It was not until the 1940's that much of the problem underwent
scientific scrutiny. The Thunderstorm Project described the dynamics of the
airmass thunderstorm, but as we now know, it did not address many of the
ancillary characteristics that thunderstorms can generate. In the late 1950's
the mountain wave was investigated and described.
With the advent of high-altitude jet aircraft in the 1950's, it was
commonly thought that flight would be above all troublesome weather. The Air
Force and, shortly thereafter, the airlines learned this was not so. A type
of turbulence called CAT (Clear-Air Turbulence) reared its head and extended
sharp claws. In February 1966 the Joint military-civilian National Committee
for Clear-Air Turbulence was established. This action, in part, led to a
period of intensive research to both describe the phenomenon and to accurately
forecast it.
In 1977, the downburst associated with thunderstorms was first
described, and since that time there have been intensive efforts to identify
the onset of this phenomenon and to give pilots a timely warning of the
hazard.
In spite of all the efforts to improve the forecasting and detection of
turbulence, the problem is still with us. Excerpts from the statistics of the
most recent period of accident records compiled by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) may give some insight into the magnitude of the problem.
Table 1 enumerates the accidents that occurred during the period from
1982 through 1984, the latest period that NTSB has complete records. It gives
the total number of accidents for the three-year period for large commercial
carriers--both scheduled and non-scheduled--operating under FAR Part 121, the
commuter and air taxis operating under FAR Part 135, and general aviation,
which includes corporate aircraft, operating under FAR Part 91. These
accidents have, in turn, been subdivided into fatal and nonfatal accidents and
subtotaled as weather-involved and, more specifically, as turbulence-involved
accidents. The weather-involved accidents are accidents in which weather is
listed as a cause or factor. Other casual factors such as those attributable
to pilot actions or maintenance problems may have been assigned to the same
accident.
More indicative of the magnitude of the weather hazard is Table 2 which
gives the weather accidents as percentages of the total number of accidents
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and the turbulence-associated accidents as a percentage both of the total
number of accidents and a percentage of weather-involved accidents. Most
significant in these numbers is that the odds that an accident involving a
large commercial carrier being in a weather accident are greater than for
either the commuter and air taxi operations or for general aviation. This is
probably due, at least in part, to the fact that the aircraft operated under
FAR Part 121 are most sophisticated and more likely to have redundant systems
than the smaller aircraft, and hence are less likely to suffer from
catastrophic mechanical failure. Additionally, the pilots, as a group, have
more experience and are less likely to become involved in situations
attributable to operational errors. But based upon their scheduled operation,
they do encounter all varieties of weather situations.
It is noteworthy that in all three operational categories, weather is a
factor in a higher percentage of fatal accidents than it is in accidents
overall, and in the case of FAR Part 121 operations, over half of all the
fatal accidents are weather involved and they account for almost all of the
fatalities. The common thread in this particular data sample is snow and/or
ice, which was a factor in four of the five fatal accidents. Engine ice and
ice and snow on the wings were major factors in the Air Florida accident in
Washington, D.C., in January 1982 which killed 78 people. During the same
month, two people were killed when a World Airways DC-IO ran off the runway
into Boston harbor due to ice and snow on the runway. The other accidents
were a Republic Airlines Convair 580 which ran into a snowbank in Brainerd,
Minnesota, on January 9, 1983. A propeller disintegrated, fatally injuring a
passenger. The other involved an Ozark Air Lines DC-9 which collided with a
snow sweeper in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on December 20, 1983, killing the
sweeper operator. The fatal accident that was not involved with snow and/or
ice was the wind shear encounter by Pan American Flight 759 on takeoff from
New Orleans International Airport on July 9, 1982, which caused 153
fatalities.
Turbulence accounts for 24 percent of the accidents involving large
commercial carriers and 54 percent (over half) of the weather-involved
accidents. Fortunately during the 1982 through 1984 time period, there were
no fatalities caused by turbulence encounters. This is not unique to the
period. There have been no fatal accidents involving large commercial
aircraft directly attributable to turbulence since the crash of a Braniff
Airways Lockheed Electra on May 3, 1968, in which 85 people were killed. In
this case, the aircraft suffered structural failure recovering from an unusual
attitude induced by a thunderstorm. There have been two fatal turbulence
accidents since that time: a Fairchild F-27 in December 1968 and a Lockheed
Hercules in May 1974. In both cases, the structural failure was attributed to
fatigue or pre-existing cracks in the airframe. This is not to imply that
turbulence is not a hazard. During the 1982 to 1984 time period, there were
81 injuries in FAR Part 121 operations, 24 of them listed as serious. This
represents both considerable pain and suffering to those involved and a
significant financial liability to the airlines. Those generally at greatest
hazard by turbulence are flight attendants who often continue cabin services
when the seat belt sign is on and are injured both by being thrown about the
aircraft's interior and by service equipment, such as food and drink carts and
galley equipment. An additional problem is the large amount of loose luggage
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and other objects that are carried aboard airliners and improperly stowed.
These objects often becomemissiles in severe turbulence.
In the categories operating under FARParts 135 and 91, the turbulence
accidents only account for 2 percent of the total accidents and 6 and 7
percent of the weather-related accidents, respectively. The difference
between the smaller commuter, air taxi, and general aviation aircraft and the
larger commercial carriers is that turbulence-related accidents with the
smaller aircraft are muchmore likely to be fatal. The reason for the lower
percentage of turbulence accidents is readily explainable. In the smaller
aircraft, the passengers and crew remain strapped in and there are generally
not the loose and potentially hazardous objects in the passenger spaces.
Consequently, the turbulence--so long as control of the aircraft is
maintained--is a discomfort. The serious problem is when control is not
maintained. The large majority of fatal turbulence encounters are a result of
the pilot losing control of the aircraft due to extreme accelerations or
disorientation and either colliding with the ground while out of control or by
overstressing the aircraft during an attempted recovery from an unusual
attitude which results in an in-flight breakup of the aircraft.
The NTSB has investigated several turbulence accidents and has made
recommendations to improve the system in those instances where the Board
believed that changes in procedures might serve to alleviate the problem to
some degree. Unfortunately, the NTSB does not have the resources to
investigate all turbulence encounters. It is limited to investigating those
classified as accidents by the Board's definition, which meansthat there was
serious injury to passengers or crew membersor sufficient damage to the
aircraft that its airworthiness was affected. The following paragraphs are
synopses of someof the accidents investigated by the NTSBwhich are examples
of the problems associated with turbulence.
On May 19, 1980, a Gates Learjet Model 25D was enroute from West Palm
Beach to New Orleans on J-58. The aircraft reached its cruise altitude of
43,000 feet Just prior to reaching Clovia Intersection, about 104 miles west
of Sarasota. Shortly after the pilot had reported leveling off the controller
at the Jacksonville Center, monitoring the frequency used by the LearJet,
heard an unusual staccato sound followed about 18 seconds later by a report
from the co-pilot, "Can't get it up...it's in a spin." About 33 seconds after
the first staccato sounds, radio and radar contact with the aircraft were
lost. Floating debris was found in the water in the vicinity of Clovia
Intersection, but the two pilots were missing and presumed to have been
killed. There were no passengers on board.
Another Learjet was following about 16 minutes behind the accident
aircraft at the same altitude. In the vicinity of Clovia Intersection the
pilot reported that he encountered the most severe turbulence he had ever
encountered in a Learjet.
An analysis of the weather conditions in the vicinity of the accident
showed an upper front or vertical discontinuity at the approximate altitude
where the aircraft encountered the turbulence. This discontinuity appeared on
the sounding of Bootheville, Louisiana, and Appalachicala and TampaBay,
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Florida, the three stations nearest to the accident.
strong vertical and horizontal wind shears in
discontinuity.
Additionally, there were
the vicinity of the
It was determined that this upper front was most likely the cause of the
turbulence that led to the accident. The NTSBbelieved that the indicators of
potential CATmay have been available prior to the accident and recommended
that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA):
Define the relationship between clear-air turbulence and upper
fronts as analyzed by soundings and develop forecasting
techniques to utilize the information to improve clear-air
turbulence forecasts.
A CATencounter by a United Airlines DC-IO over Morton, Wyoming, caused
serious injuries to seven people and minor injuries to 19 others as well as
causing damageto the aircraft, mostly to the interior from objects tossed
about the aircraft.
A study of the weather data available showed that conditions were
approaching those conducive to mountain wave development, but of several
systems used to forecast the onset of a mountain wave only one would have
forecast it and then only based upon the hourly data recorded about 2 minutes
prior to the accident. Analysis also showed that there was a discontinuity
below the tropopause with 10 kts of wind shear across it recorded at one
sounding station. The conclusion was that the turbulence was caused by a
combination of an incipient mountain wave and wind shear through an
atmospheric discontinuity. It was also concluded that there were no known
forecasting systems that would have predicted the turbulence.
There have been two accidents caused by turbulence that have been
associated with strong upper level winds in the vicinity of intruding
thunderstorms. These are the accidents involving a United Airlines DC-IO near
Hannibal, Missouri, on April 3, 1981, and an Air CanadaL-1011 about 60 miles
south of Wilmington, North Carolina, over the Atlantic Oceanon November24,
1983. In the United Airlines accident there were eight serious injuries, and
in the Air Canadaaccident there were five serious injuries.
In both cases there were developed or developing thunderstorms in the
vicinity of the Jet stream, and the aircraft encountered the turbulence
several miles downwindof the thunderstorm cell. The United pilot reported
being in cirrus clouds, probably an anvil cloud. There have been several
studies of these accidents with efforts to describe the atmospheric mechanics.
Hopefully, these will lead to a better understanding of the phenomenon. In
any event, the area downwindof a thunderstorm in a jet stream regime should
be considered potentially turbulent. This is not a new idea. The Air Force
has preached this gospel for many years and at least one airline recommends
aircraft avoid thunderstorms downwindby at least one mile for every knot of
wind speed at flight altitude.
As a result of its investigation of these two accidents, the HTSB
recommendedthat NOAA:
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Advise its weather forecasters to be alert for situations where
there is a jet stream or strong upper level winds in association
with lines of developing or developed thunderstorms which may
produce an area of severe clear-air turbulence, and to issue
appropriate warnings of this potential turbulence to pilots
through area forecasts, SIGMET's, or other appropriate means of
communication.
In spite of years of efforts, the problem is not solved and will
probably never have a complete solution but improvements can be made.
Instrumentation is being improved in quantum jumps and with this improvement
will come better observations, a better understanding of the dynamics of
turbulence, and in turn better forecasts with a better understanding of
turbulence will come improved training helping pilots to recognize some
turbulent situations and avoid them. This will help but will not be the total
cure. The scale of someturbulence is too small for accurate forecasts. Here
the answer may be on-board detectors that will give pilots a warning of
turbulence ahead.
However, the problem is approached, the efforts of many scientists and
engineers will be needed to help bring increased safety and comfort to those
not always so-friendly skies.
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TABLE 1. U.S. Civil Aviation Aircraft Accident Totals for the Time Period
1982 to 1984.
Total Fatal Fatalities Weather Fatal
accidents accidents accidents weather
accidents
Weather Turbulence Fatal Turbulence
fatalities accidents turbulence fatalities
accidents
FAR
Part 121
large
commercial
62 9 253 28 5 235 15 0 0
FAR
Part 135
commuter and
air taxi
485 96 260 154 43 106 9 5 17
FAR
Part 91
general
aviation
9,302 1,688 3,377 2,593 717 1,561 198 94 237
TABLE 2. U.S. Civil Aviation Weather Accident Percentages for the Time
Period 1982 to 1984.
Weather Fatal Weather Turbulence Fatal Turbulence Turbulence Fatal Turbulence
accidents, weather fatalities, accidents, turbulence fatalities, accidents, turbulence fatalities,
percent accidents, percent percent accidents, percent percent accidents, percent
of all percent of all of all percent of all of all percent of all
accidents of all fatalities accidents of all fatalities weather of all weather
fatal fatal accidents fatal fatalities
accidents accidents weather
accidents
FAR
Part 121
large
commercial
45 56 93 24 0 0 54 O 0
FAR
Part 135
commuter and
air taxi
32 45 41 2 5 7 6 12 16
FAR
part 91
general
aviation
28 42 46 2 8 6 7 13 15
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